When the Philippines faced a rice shortage in 1972 after natural disasters, pest problems, and ravaged crops, the government had a promising answer called Masagana 99. The program had three main goals: to recover previous losses, scale down importation, and achieve rice self-sufficiency. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Instead of increasing the amount of land farmed, Masagana 99 aimed to increase the rice yield per hectare to 99 cavans, more than doubling the then national average of 40 cavans per hectare. The Department of Agriculture (DA) planned to do this by implementing a two-pronged approach: developing more effective farming technology, and then offering loan programs that gave farmers access to this technology. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Researchers from the International Rice Research Institute in Los Ba\u00f1os, Laguna spearheaded the development of an \u201cintegrated package of technology\u201d which could produce the 99 cavan-yield per hectare even in non-irrigated land, which then DA secretary Arturo Tangco Jr. would later approve. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Meanwhile, the Central Bank channeled funds to lower the cost of borrowing and get the technology into the hands of most farmers. It was partially funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This combination was initially effective, as the World Bank praised the program in 1982 for letting farmers access billions of pesos in credit and for letting the country reach rice self-sufficiency by 1997.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
As Philippine Rice Research Institute executive director Dr. Santiago Obien noted, the program was successful in \u201cproducing enough food at that time, and in averting some potential social problems.\u201d However, Obien said that the program had its share of problems<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Rotten Fruit<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Only a year after the World Bank praised the program for its success in distributing credit, they said that many farmers failed to pay because of accumulated overdue fees caused by problems in the program\u2019s management among others. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Credit interests soared from 12% to 16-38%, further incapacitating the farmers’ ability to pay off their debts. The overdue fees \u201cdisqualified a large number of small farmers from receiving fresh credit and also disqualified many rural banks from receiving rediscounting support from the Central Bank.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Apart from staggering debt to the World Bank, the agriculture sector’s productivity almost reached a flatline, with more chemical imports than growth in local production.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This lack of repayment meant that the program\u2019s funds were running out. As a 1991 report found, about 80% of the Masagana-99 loans were never paid. Although Cornell University professor Randolph Barker spun it positively by calling it a \u201cmoney transfer\u201d instead, this meant that the program would inevitably crash and burn. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Because of its unsustainability, Kenneth Smith lamented its wasted potential, saying that \u201cthe program\u2019s actual achievements were much more mundane than anticipated, and even this degree of success was more fortuitous than finessed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As Finance Secretary Carlos Dominguez III pointed out, however, the worst thing is not that the program wasted its potential; it is that Masagana 99 tanked the rural banking system and pushed thousands of farmers into debt as well. <\/p>\n\n\n\n After Senator Imee Marcos said that Masagana 99 was an effective use of banks for agriculture in the 70s, Dominguez decided to counter the senator\u2019s claims. “I was the Secretary of Agriculture who cleaned up the mess that was left by Masagana 99. There were about 800 rural banks that were bankrupted by that program and we had to rescue them,” he said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The dictator\u2019s daughter replied that while it may have had its problems on the banking end, it made up for it in terms of rice exportation. When looking at the data, however, Eduardo Tadem found that this was only true for a few years, as the country stopped exporting once more in 1985.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tadem also found that the program only worsened lives for the farmers, as all of their production gains were canceled out by increased costs. In the end, they were in debt with no improvements to show for it. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite its initial success, the program failed. As National Scientist Emil Javier wrote in a column for the Manila Bulletin: \u201cMasagana 99 proved to be short-lived and unsustainable mainly due to the costly subsidies and failure of many farmers-borrowers to repay the loans . . . By [1980], Masagana 99 ceased to be of consequence as only 3.7% of the small rice farmers were able to borrow.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Scientists, economists, and farmers continue to condemn Masagana 99\u2019s failure and Marcos\u2019s attempt at distorting history. Farmers\u2019 group MASIPAG condemned how \u201cthe Philippine rice industry was reoriented into a profit-based, corporatized business venture through Marcos\u2019 agricultural project, Masagana 99. <\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe attempt at ‘modernized’ rice production failed, and it was at the expense of our Filipino farmers and the country\u2019s food security.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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